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Abstract 
International financial integration allows countries to become net creditors or net debtors with respect 
to the rest of the world. In this paper, we show that a small set of fundamentals--shifts in relative 
output levels, the stock of public debt and demographic factors--can do much to explain the evolution 
of net foreign asset positions. In addition, we highlight that ￿external wealth￿ plays a critical role in 
determining the behavior of the trade balance, both through shifts in the desired net foreign asset 
position and the investment returns generated on the outstanding stock of net foreign assets. Finally, 
we provide some evidence that a portfolio balance effect exists: real interest rate differentials are 
inversely related to net foreign asset positions. 
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 1. Introduction 
The global integration of capital markets has been one of the biggest stories in the world economy in 
recent decades. International asset trade offers several potential benefits. Countries can share risks via 
international portfolio diversification; the efficient allocation of capital to the most productive 
locations is promoted; and consumption can be smoothed across time periods in response to shifts in 
macroeconomic fundamentals. While risk-sharing may be largely accomplished through gross 
international asset trade, net capital flows will typically be required for the latter two functions. 
With respect to net asset trade, the empirical literature initiated by Feldstein and Horioka 
(1980) has focused on the evolution of current accounts across countries and through time, 
highlighting the degree of co-movement between national saving and domestic investment. Another 
branch of the literature has investigated whether net capital flows respond appropriately to cyclical 
macroeconomic shocks, most prominently in the literature that has tested ￿present value￿ models of 
the current account (see Obstfeld and Rogoff 1996). 
In this paper, we instead turn our attention to the stocks of external assets and liabilities, 
studying the long-term factors driving the evolution of countries￿ net external positions. Our interest 
in this subject, which has have received much less attention in the literature, is based on a number of 
considerations. First, international macroeconomic theory suggests that a host of long-term 
fundamentals can lead to countries becoming persistent international net creditors or international net 
debtors. Such long-term factors can be missed if emphasis is exclusively placed on current account 
imbalances, even using long spans of data: for instance, a country may run persistent current account 
deficits but still be reducing its external liabilities relative to GDP.  Second, if long-term factors are 
important in determining net foreign asset positions, short-term flows cannot be properly understood 
unless the constraints imposed by long-run equilibrium conditions are explicitly taken into account. 
For example, the implications of a country￿s current account deficit depend on whether it is moving 
the country towards or away from its target long-run net foreign asset position.    2 
Why then has little attention been devoted to studying such longer-run issues? Paucity of data 
on foreign asset and liability stocks has been a traditional barrier to research on net foreign asset 
positions. Only a few countries have published reliable estimates of accumulated stocks, whereas 
current account data have been much more widely available. In Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (1999), we 
have employed a uniform methodology to generate estimates of foreign asset and liability positions 
for a large number of industrial and developing countries over the past three decades. This data set  
enables us to analyze the behavior of net foreign asset positions in a more comprehensive manner 
than in the efforts of previous researchers. 
We address three questions about net foreign asset positions. First, we try to explain their 
behavior, across countries and over time, investigating why some countries are net creditors and 
others net debtors, and why some creditors turn into debtors, such as the United States, and vice-
versa, like Singapore. Identifying the long-term macroeconomic forces underlying the endogenous 
determination of net foreign asset positions provides insight into the role played by international 
financial integration in allowing countries to de-link national production and consumption.  
Second, we identify two mechanisms that link trade balances to net foreign asset positions. 
One key channel is that changes in the target long-run net foreign asset position are an important 
force driving the current account. The other is that, for a given desired net foreign asset position, a 
country that enjoys high returns on its foreign assets and pays out low returns on its foreign liabilities 
can afford to run a smaller trade surplus (or larger trade deficit). In this way, we highlight the role of a 
state variable (the net foreign asset position) in determining the dynamics of the trade balance. 
Third, we explore the relation between net foreign asset positions and the real interest rate 
differential. This is an old question in the portfolio balance literature: do debtor countries pay a risk 
premium? The traditional literature attempted to link currency return differentials to outstanding 
relative stocks of national monies but much less research has been directed at linking differences in 
real interest rates across countries to long-run net foreign asset positions (Frankel and Rose, 1995).  
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we briefly discuss the broad  3 
properties of our data set of foreign assets and liabilities. The determination of long-run net foreign 
asset positions is investigated in section 3. Section 4 models the short-run dynamics of the net foreign 
asset position and the behavior of the trade balance. We turn in section 5 to the relation between the 
net foreign asset position and the real interest rate differential. Conclusions and directions for future 
research are offered in section 6. 
2. International Balance Sheets: Stylized Facts 
2.1 METHODOLOGY 
A country￿s net external position is the sum of net claims of domestic residents on non-residents.  In 
line with the way in which transactions are recorded in balance of payments statistics, we classify 
external assets and liabilities into three main categories: foreign direct investment (FDI), portfolio 
equity (EQ), and debt instruments (DEBT).  Foreign exchange reserves (FX) belong in this last 
category, although we keep them separate in the overall accounting. Hence we define net foreign 
assets (NFA) as follows 
  it it it it it it it it NFA FDIA EQA DEBTA FX FDIL EQL DEBTL =+ + + −− −  (1) 
where the letter A indicates assets and the letter L liabilities. The FDI category reflects a ￿lasting 
interest￿ of an entity resident in one economy in an enterprise resident in another economy (IMF, 
1993). This includes greenfield investment as well as equity participation giving a controlling stake 
(typically set at above 10%), while remaining equity purchases are classified under portfolio equity 
investment.
1 The debt category includes trade credits, bank loans and portfolio bond instruments.  
For most industrial countries, estimates of stocks of external assets and liabilities are 
published by national authorities and collected by the IMF and the OECD, but coverage starts for 
most countries only in the early eighties.  The corresponding measure of net foreign assets is called 
the International Investment Position (IIP).  For developing countries, however, comprehensive stock 
                                                 
1 This implies that in certain cases the distinction between these two categories can de facto be blurred, but the 
issue cannot be clarified further in the absence of detailed disaggregated data.  4 
data are generally available only for external debt and foreign exchange reserves; IIP availability is 
limited, especially along the time series dimension.  In addition, the methodologies used to estimate 
the various stocks of equation (1) often differ across countries (for example, book or market value for 
equity and FDI) making cross-country comparisons more difficult.   
In order to overcome the limitations in existing data, we have constructed data on external 
assets and liabilities for 66 industrial and developing countries, covering the period 1970-1998. We 
discuss in detail the methodology we use for estimating net external positions in Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (1999). Broadly speaking, we rely on stock data, when available, supplemented by cumulative 
flows data, with appropriate valuation adjustments. The latter are particularly important given the 
increased role played by portfolio equity and FDI flows during the past decade.  
The use of flow data can be better understood by considering the fundamental balance of 
payments identity, which states that the current account, net financial flows and changes in foreign 
exchange reserves sum to zero, with a term capturing ￿net errors and omissions￿ acting as the 
balancing item.
2 Financial flows can be divided between FDI, portfolio equity and debt flows, plus a 
term capturing capital account transfers, which include debt forgiveness operations and other 
transactions that do not give rise to a corresponding asset or liability.  The evolution of net claims on 
the rest of the world is dictated by the flows of new net claims￿which equal the current account 
balance net of capital transfers 
k
t TR ￿and by capital gains and losses KG on existing claims 
 
k
it it it it NFA CA TR KG ∆= + +  (2) 
Our first measure of net foreign assets, CUMCA, is available for all countries and is obtained by 
cumulating current account balances, net of capital transfers, with appropriate adjustments designed 
to take into account valuation effects, debt reduction and debt forgiveness and other terms subsumed 
in KG. For example, we adjust the outstanding stock of equity assets and liabilities so as to reflect 
variations in the US$ value of stock market indices, and the stocks of inward and outward FDI to 
                                                 
2 We assume that errors and omissions reflect changes in the debt assets held by country residents abroad, in 
line with the capital flight literature. See Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (1999) for a discussion of this issue.  5 
reflect changes in the cross-country prices of capital goods. A comparison with existing data on 
stocks of external assets and liabilities provides a satisfactory robustness check on our methodology. 
For developing countries, we also construct a second measure, CUMFL, that is obtained as 
the sum of stocks of the various external assets and liabilities, calculated as adjusted cumulative 
capital flows or, as is the case for external debt and foreign exchange reserves, as direct stock 
measures.  As is explained in detail in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (1999), our CUMCA measure 
implicitly considers estimates of cumulative unrecorded capital flows as assets held by the country 
residents abroad.  Instead, CUMFL includes unrecorded capital outflows only to the degree that they 
are reflected in net errors and omissions, and hence a lower fraction of unrecorded external capital 
holdings than CUMCA.
3  We use these measures to supplement the existing IIP data. 
Before turning to the presentation of the data, it is important to point out that the 
measurement of international current and capital transactions faces severe problems, in particular 
under-recording of exports/capital outflows, reflected in the existence of a measured ￿world current 
account deficit￿ (over US$70 billion in 1998).  These problems are unavoidably reflected in our data, 
which makes use of official sources; even though we try to account to the extent possible for 
unrecorded capital outflows, external assets are as a whole underreported.   
 
2.2 NET FOREIGN ASSETS: BROAD TRENDS 
The distribution of countries between large and small creditors and debtors in 1975, 1986 and 
                                                 
3 For developing countries, the CUMCA measure determines the stock of debt assets residually, after 
subtracting from the estimated net external position the net FDI and equity positions and the difference between 
reserves and external debt. To understand the difference with CUMFL, consider, for example, the case of a 
country with a trade deficit entirely financed by a flow of new debt liaiblities (and errors and omissions equal to 
zero). Assume, as has often been the case in developing countries during periods of capital flight, that the 
change in the stock of external debt (measured by World Bank data) exceeds the recorded debt inflow in the 
balance of payments. Cumulating the current account (as in CUMCA) implies that the change in the net external 
position is equal to the recorded flow of new debt, and thus implicitly assumes that the difference between the 
change in the stock of debt and the flow is offset by an accumulation of debt assets of the country abroad  If 
debt assets are instead estimated directly as cumulative flows (as is the case for CUMFL) the change in the net 
external position corresponds to the increase in the stock of external debt.   6 
1997 is depicted in Figure 1.
4  In industrial countries as a whole the dispersion of net external 
positions has increased during the past 25 years, with an increase in the number of relatively large 
debtors, especially between 1975 and 1986, and in the number of creditors with assets above 10 
percent of GDP.  For developing countries, there is a large increase in the number of countries with 
￿large￿ external liabilities (over 40 percent of GDP) between the 1970s and the 1980s, in the 
aftermath of the debt crisis. More generally, a pattern of increased dispersion in net external positions 
is also visible, and is especially strong between the 1970s and the 1980s.  
Figure 2 plots different net foreign asset measures as ratio of GDP for a selection of industrial 
countries for the period 1970-1998. We graph both our estimate CUMCA and the direct estimate of 
net foreign assets (IIP) when available.
5  Only a few countries have remained creditors throughout the 
past three decades (Germany, Japan, Netherlands and Switzerland); the rest of the group is almost 
evenly split between persistent debtors and ￿switchers.￿ Among the latter, the most well known case is 
the United States.  
Figure 3 plots net foreign asset measures for some of the developing nations in our sample, 
highlighting a number of interesting facts. First, the dynamics of external positions in the countries 
most affected by the debt crisis is similar, with a sharp worsening during the early 1980s and an 
improvement later in the decade. Second, net external liabilities measured with CUMFL are 
significantly larger than CUMCA in several countries (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Indonesia), 
reflecting unrecorded capital outflows. The third is the effect of the currency collapse due to the 
Asian crisis on external liabilities in Indonesia and to a lesser degree in Thailand. Finally, the 
improvement of Singapore￿s net external position over time is remarkable.
6 
3. The Determinants of Net Foreign Asset Positions 
We propose a parsimonious reduced-form model of the net foreign asset position 
                                                 
4 We focus here just on the overall net foreign asset position. See Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2000b) for a 
discussion of the composition of the ￿external capital structure.￿ 
5  In Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (1999) we explain the most relevant differences between these two measures. 
6  Taiwan shows a similar, albeit less dramatic trend among the economies in our sample.  7 
  ’; [ , ,] it it it it it it it b Z Z YC GDEBT DEM σε =+ =  (3) 
where  it b  is country i￿s ratio of net foreign assets to GDP in year t,  it YC  is its output per capita, 
it GDEBT  is its level of public debt and it DEM is a set of demographic variables. As the discussion 
in the next subsection makes clear, we have followed the main themes developed in the theoretical 
literature in selecting these variables as the primary determinants of net foreign asset positions.
7 It is 
important to take note that all variables should be interpreted as measured relative to global values, 
since common movements in output per capita, demographic trends and government debt should not 
affect net foreign assets but rather will operate via global variables such as the world real interest rate.  
3.1 THEORETICAL CHANNELS 
Relative output per capita can affect net foreign asset positions through several channels. First, if the 
domestic marginal product of capital decreases as an economy grows richer, domestic investment will 
fall and home investors will seek out overseas accumulation opportunities. Second, an increase in 
domestic income may lead to a rise in the domestic savings rate. This result is most clearly generated 
in models with habit formation in consumption preferences: as an economy grows, consumption will 
lag behind output (see, for instance, Carroll, Overland and Weil, 2000). An alternative explanation 
has been suggested by Rebelo (1992): under Geary-Stone preferences, the savings rate will also be 
increasing in income levels, since the marginal utility of extra consumption sharply diminishes once 
basic consumption needs are satisfied. We not that, even if the increase in the savings rate is 
temporary, there may be a permanent improvement in the net foreign asset position. A positive 
relation between relative output per capita and the net foreign asset position is also captured in the 
traditional ￿stages of the balance of payments￿ hypothesis (see Halevi, 1971, and Fischer and Frenkel, 
1974).  
                                                 
7  Since we have a limited number of time series observations, we are constrained in the number of determinants 
that we can include in our empirical work. As is detailed in subsection 3a, there are myriad  channels by which 
these variables can potentially affect net foreign asset positions and a number of theoretical contributions 
highlight some of these individual mechanisms.  Building an integrative general equilibrium model that would 
nest the various hypotheses is beyond the scope of this paper and our empirical specification will inevitably not 
be able to discriminate between all competing theories.   8 
Although these factors point to a positive relation between relative output per capita and the 
net foreign asset position, an effect operating in the opposite direction may be at work  in developing 
countries operating under credit constraints. In models in which an improvement in net worth or cash 
flow relaxes financial constraints, an increase in production may allow greater recourse to foreign 
credit, possibly implying a negative relation between net external assets and relative output at least 
over some interval.  
  The second variable we consider is the stock of public debt. In a world that exhibits 
departures from Ricardian equivalence, higher levels of public debt may be associated with a decline 
in the external position. For instance, in the Blanchard-Yaari finite-horizon model, an increase in 
public debt is not fully offset by an increase in private asset accumulation since public debt is 
perceived as net wealth by current generations, who will bear only part of the tax burden implied by 
its higher stock (Blanchard, 1985, Faruqee and Laxton, 2000).  
Third, demographic factors are also potentially important determinants of the net foreign 
assets. For instance, countries with an ageing population can prepare for an increase in the ratio of 
retirees to workers by accumulating overseas assets to supplement domestic income streams. 
Domestic investment in these countries will also be curtailed as the marginal product of capital is 
diminished by a reduction in the growth of (or a decline in) the working-age population and the labor 
force.  
At the other end of the population distribution, a society with a high youth dependency ratio 
may require heavy investment in social infrastructure (education, housing). A high youth dependency 
ratio may also reduce the savings rate, as households with children attempt to smooth consumption. 
Accordingly, we may expect to see a decline in net foreign assets in countries experiencing a rise in 
the youth dependency ratio (see also Taylor, 1994, Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996, Higgins, 1998). 
However, the impact of demographic factors on the net foreign asset position is not just a 
function of the youth and old-age dependency ratios but also of the age structure of the working-age 
population (Mundell, 1991). For instance, a relatively young workforce may be associated with  9 
relatively low saving and high investment whereas an older workforce may be associated with a rise 
in the net foreign asset position, as the saving for retirement motive kicks in and domestic investment 
falls. For this reason, we will employ the entire age distribution in our empirical work. 
Finally, some authors have recently modeled the determination of net foreign asset positions 
in a stylized mean-variance portfolio framework, with the demand and supply for domestic and 
foreign assets being determined by risk and return characteristics and by the profiles of investors (see 
Calder￿n, Loayza and ServØn, 2000, Kraay, Loayza, ServØn and Ventura, 2000 and Edwards, 2001). 
As the preceding discussion has highlighted, our fundamentals --- output per capita, public debt and 
demography --- potentially affect these factors in complex ways. Among the channels not already 
discussed, output per capita and years-to-retirement may plausibly affect the degree of risk aversion. 
However, the relation between risk aversion and the net foreign asset position depends on whether the 
￿safe￿ asset is domestic or foreign, which is typically a model-specific choice.  
3.2 PREVIOUS EMPIRICAL WORK 
Masson, Kremers and Horne (1994) is one of the very limited number of studies focusing on 
the evolution of net foreign assets.
8 In their country studies of the United States, Japan and Germany 
over the period 1960-85, they relate net foreign asset positions to the overall dependency ratio and the 
level of government debt, but do not include the level of income per capita.
9 They find evidence of a 
long run relation between these variables, and highlight the role of feedback mechanisms working 
through absorption in the adjustment process towards the long-run equilibrium. Calder￿n, Loayza and 
ServØn (2000) relate the evolution of net foreign assets to composite measures of risk and return; they 
find support for their specification, particularly for countries with low barriers to international capital 
movements. 
  Taylor (1994), Higgins (1998) and Herbertsson and Zoega (1999) have provided some 
                                                 
8 Halevi (1971) and Roldos (1996) provide some empirical evidence on the ￿stages of the balance of payments￿ 
hypothesis. 
9 In a study of OECD countries, Bayoumi and Gagnon (1996) also control for fiscal and demographic effects 
but their primary focus is on the effects of inflation on net foreign asset positions.  10 
evidence that demographic factors are an important driving force of medium-term current account 
behavior. Herbertsson and Zoega (1999) focus in particular on the link between population age 
structure and public and private saving behavior: they highlight how countries with high youth 
dependency ratios tend to have larger current account deficits.
10 Employing a demographic 
specification similar to ours, Taylor (1994) and Higgins (1998) show that the demographic structure 
is quantitatively important in explaining medium-term current account behavior.  
3.3 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Our empirical analysis of the long-run behavior of net foreign assets uses data for 66 countries
 
spanning the period 1970-1998.
  Throughout our empirical work, we split the sample between 
￿industrial￿ and ￿developing￿ countries.
 11  The industrial countries consist of long-standing members 
of the OECD, which approximately corresponds to the most-developed set of countries at the start of 
the sample period. We allow for potentially different relations between our fundamentals and net 
foreign asset positions for the two groups, as well as for differences in data quality. For instance, we 
have already noted that the output per capita may exert different effects in both groups and the 
difference in life expectancy and in retirement patterns means that demographic effects plausibly will 
also differ across the two samples. Furthermore, differences in the pervasiveness of liquidity 
constraints and other sources of violation from Ricardian equivalence may induce differences in the 
relation between net foreign assets and public debt in the two groups. 
We use the following variables: net foreign assets as a ratio of GDP (CUMCA and CUMFL 
measures, as well as the IIP measure for robustness checks), GDP per capita in 1995 US dollars (in 
                                                 
10 However, Chinn and Prasad (2000) find instead only weak evidence of a systematic impact of dependency 
ratios on current account balances in a wide sample of industrial and developing countries. 
11 ￿Industrial￿ countries include the United States, United Kingdom, Austria, Belgium-Luxembourg, Denmark, 
France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Canada, Japan, Finland, Greece, Iceland, 
Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Australia and New Zealand. ￿Developing￿ countries are Turkey, South Africa, 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Israel, 
Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Syrian Republic, Egypt, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, India, Indonesia, Korea, 
Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Algeria, Botswana, C￿te d’Ivoire, Mauritius, Morocco, 
Zimbabwe, Tunisia, and China.   11 
log form), the stock of public debt as a ratio of GDP and the shares of population under 14, over 65 
and between 15 and 64 (in 5-year cohorts).
12   
Public debt is defined as the sum of external public debt, net of foreign exchange reserves, 
and gross domestic public debt.
13  For industrial countries, the main source of data for public debt is 
the OECD (general government definition); for developing countries, the data have been constructed 
using the World Bank￿s Global Development Finance, the IMF￿s Government Financial Statistics and 
national sources. Unfortunately the definition of government for developing countries is not 
homogeneous￿it can refer to central government, general government or nonfinancial public sector.  
When data availability was not a constraint, we have used the broadest definition of government. A 
data Appendix detailing sources and definitions for the debt data is available from the authors.  
Finally, population shares were constructed using the United Nations￿ Demographic 
Yearbook (Historical Supplement 1948-1997), supplemented by data from Herbertsson and Zoega 
(1999).
14   
3.3.1 Bivariate Relations  As a precursor to the multivariate econometric work, we begin in Figures 
6-8 by showing the bivariate relations between net foreign asset positions on the one side and output 
per capita, public debt and demographic structure on the other.  In these graphs, the data are measured 
in terms of average changes between the 1980-89 and 1990-98, capturing the medium- or long-term 
movement in country positions.
15 In each figure, Panels A and B contain observations from the 
industrial and developing countries respectively. 
Panel A of Figure 4 shows a quite striking positive bivariate relation between growth in 
                                                 
12 Ideally, we would like to measure net foreign assets relative to a country￿s total wealth but this would require 
data on land values, natural resources, human capital and the value of domestic assets. In any event, it is 
plausible that GDP may serve as a reasonable proxy for wealth. 
13 We would of course prefer to use net domestic public debt, but data availability for such a measure is much 
more limited. Since we focus on time series behavior, and given the strong co-movement between the two 
measures for those countries for which they are both available, we are confident that this choice still allows us 
to capture the right long-run relation. As we will discuss later, obstacles are more serious when undertaking 
cross-sectional analysis because of cross-country differences in the definitions of ￿government.￿  
14 We thank these authors for kindly sharing their data. 
15 This ￿cross-section in first differences￿ is essentially a country fixed-effects specification, picking up intra-
country time variation. We get similar graphs if we also employ data from the 1970s but the more recent period 
offers more complete data and may better capture behavior under integrated capital markets.  12 
output per capita and improvement in the net foreign asset position among the industrial nations. A 
significant positive relation between output per capita and the net foreign asset position is also evident 
in the developing country sample in Panel B of Figure 6. However, the slope is flatter and the overall 
fit is much weaker. We will return to the difference in slopes between the industrial and developing 
samples when interpreting the results of the regression analysis below. 
Figure 5 plots the change in the net foreign asset position against the change in the public 
debt to GDP ratio. For both industrial and developing countries, we observe an inverse bivariate 
relation: growth in public debt tends to be associated with a decline in the net foreign asset position.  
We turn to the impact of demographic structure in Figure 6. This figure charts the correlation 
between the change in the net foreign asset position and the change in the population shares in each 
age cohort (0-14, 15-19, ￿ , 60-64, 65+). For the industrial countries, we see that an increase in the 
youth dependency ratio is associated with a decline in the net foreign asset position, as is an increase 
in the 30-49 age groups (albeit these correlations are weaker). There is a ￿twin peaks￿ effect here: 
increases in both the 15-29 and 50-64 age groups are associated with an improvement in net foreign 
assets. For the developing countries, the impact of demographic structure is more uniform: an 
increase in the 15-29 population share is associated with a decline in the net foreign asset position, 
whereas the 30-49 population share exerts a positive effect.  
Although these scatter diagrams provide some suggestive evidence, the interpretation of 
bivariate relations of course should not be pushed too far. For instance, there is a strong correlation in 
the data between demographic structure and output per capita, both along the time series and the 
cross-sectional dimension, which could explain the co-movements of one of these variables with net 
foreign assets. To uncover whether all of these variables play a simultaneous role in the dynamics of 
net foreign assets, we next turn to panel regressions for formal multivariate regression analysis. 
3.3.2 Panel Fixed-Effects Regression Analysis Since we are interested in the role played by shifts in 
our fundamentals in explaining the dynamic evolution of net foreign asset positions, we focus on a 
fixed-effects panel specification in this subsection (we consider the cross-section evidence in the next  13 
subsection). The country fixed effects also have the merit of soaking up unobserved variables that 
may lead to permanent differences in measured net foreign asset positions across countries.
16 To 
control for common global movements, in particular of world GDP per capita, demographics and 
public debt, we also include time dummies in all the regressions. 
As a precursor to the regression analysis, we explored the univariate time series properties of 
the data. We tested for nonstationarity in our series for net foreign assets, demographic variables, 
government debt and log GDP per capita using the NPT1.1 econometric package--see Chiang and 
Kao (2000).  The tests were performed separately on the industrial and the developing country 
samples, using the panel unit root test of Hadri (2000) (allowing for fixed effects and no time trend). 
For all series in the four samples, the test rejects the null hypothesis of stationarity.
17 In light of the 
evidence on the presence of unit roots, we subsequently tested for panel cointegration among our 
variables using tests suggested by Kao (1999) and Pedroni (1999). Both are residual-based tests for 
which the null hypothesis is lack of cointegration (nonstationarity of residuals).  These test statistics 
are reported in Table 1 and strongly suggest the existence of a cointegrating relation among net 
foreign assets and our fundamentals.  
Having ascertained that the variables display a common trend, we follow Stock and Watson 
(1993) and estimate their long-run relation using a dynamic ordinary least squares (DOLS [-1,1]) 
specification.
18 We report estimates for the 1970-98 and 1980-98 intervals. The data set is more 
complete for the post-1980s period and, in addition, this latter period may better reflect an 
environment of open capital accounts.
19 
With respect to the specification, we want to allow the entire age structure to influence the net 
                                                 
16 This may capture both country-specific determinants of net foreign asset positions and permanent 
measurement errors in our estimates of national net foreign asset positions. 
17 Other panel unit root tests gave broadly similar results.  The unit root test results are available from the 
authors. 
18 A DOLS[-2,2] specification gave similar results. Only leads and lags of output growth and changes in  public 
debt are included (including changes in demographic variables makes no difference). Standard errors are 
corrected for heteroskedasticity.  
19 In future work, we plan to explicitly look at measures of capital account liberalization.  14 
foreign asset position but do not wish to estimate independent parameters for our twelve age cohorts. 
We therefore follow Higgins (1998) by restricting the coefficients on the population share variables to 
lie along a cubic polynomial, so that only three composite demographic variables need actually be 
entered into the regression specification (see the Appendix for details).  
Tables 2 and 3 reports the results of the panel estimation (with fixed country and time effects) 
for the industrial and developing country samples respectively. For the industrial country sample, we 
use both our measure of net foreign asset positions (CUMCA) and, for robustness, a measure that 
replaces CUMCA by official international investment position data where it is available for most of 
the sample period (CUMCA+IIP). For developing countries, we employ the two alternative measures 
of the net foreign asset position (CUMCA and CUMFL) described in Section 2. We also report results 
when Singapore is excluded from the sample, since it is an extreme observation with respect to its net 
foreign asset position, and its role as banking center complicates considerably the construction of 
accurate net foreign asset measures (indeed, CUMFL is not available). Finally, in each case, we also 
report results for balanced samples. 
For the industrial country sample, Table 2 shows a consistently strong positive influence of 
output per capita on the net foreign asset position. The stable point coefficient of about 0.9 means that 
a 10 percent improvement in a country￿s relative output per capita is associated with a 9 percentage 
point improvement in its ratio of net foreign assets to GDP. This result provides supporting evidence 
those theories outlined in section 3a that predict a positive comovement between output per capita and 
net foreign assets. 
If we consider the 1970-98 interval, the results for public debt and demographic structure are 
also quite strong. In line with our theoretical prior, net foreign assets are negatively related to the size 
of the government debt. The statistically significant -0.125 point estimate implies that the net foreign 
asset to GDP ratio falls by 6 percentage points in a country that experiences a 40 percentage point 
increase in its public debt to GDP ratio (relative to the world average), indicating that government 
debt is largely domestically absorbed.   15 
The relation between net foreign assets and demographic structure also accords with the 
thrust of the theoretical literature: a decline in the net foreign asset occurs if there is an increase in the 
population shares of younger age cohorts, whereas the net foreign asset position responds positively 
to an increase in the share of workers nearing retirement, with a maximum effect for the 50-54 age 
group. It is also interesting to note that the over-65 age group exerts a negative effect, consistent with 
the running down of net foreign assets. 
However, as is evident from columns (2) and (4) in Table 2, the significance of the public 
debt and demographic results is lost if we just look at the more recent 1980-98 period.  With regard to 
public debt, the weakening of the conditional correlation is due to just one country, Australia, where 
public debt exhibits a strong positive co-movement with net foreign assets. If Australia is excluded 
from the sample, the coefficient on public debt rises to -0.12 and is strongly statistically significant. 
Results for the balanced sample are similar to those for the 1970-98 period for the full sample.
20 
  We next turn to the results for the developing country sample. First, across columns (1)-(6), 
we observe a negative relation between output per capita and the net foreign asset position: as a 
developing country becomes relatively richer, it typically sees an increase in its net external 
liabilities. The contrast with the result for the industrial country sample is quite striking, although the 
negative coefficient is typically small and is insignificant in column (2). As was noted in section 3.1, 
a negative association between output per capita and net foreign assets is consistent with the 
relaxation of binding credit constraints on developing countries.
21 
Second, Table 3 shows a very strong inverse relation between public debt and the net foreign 
asset position. A point estimate in the range [-0.67, -0.86] implies that a 20 percentage point increase 
                                                 
20 Belgium-Luxembourg, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Norway and Portugal were dropped to obtain a balanced 
sample. 
21 Results clearly suggest that the relation between output per capita and net foreign assets over the entire 
sample of industrial and developing countries, is non-monotonic. To some extent, we capture a nonlinear 
relation by splitting the sample between industrial and developing countries.  We also tried to capture 
nonlinearities within the developing country sample by positing the existence of a threshold level of income 
(varying the choice of threshold), as well as by splitting the developing country sample into richer and poorer 
countries based on initial or average income. However, no strong evidence of nonlinearity emerges from the 
analysis￿the relation with income per capita remains weak statistically and economically.   16 
in government debt is associated with a [13.4, 17.2] percentage point decline in net foreign assets.  
This high ￿pass-through￿ from net government liabilities to net external liabilities is also consistent 
with pervasive credit constraints in developing countries, since credit market imperfections are 
understood to be a primary source of deviations from Ricardian Equivalence (Bernheim 1987).
22 
With respect to the impact of demographic structure on the net foreign asset positions of 
developing countries, the evidence in Table 3 shows a pattern similar to that for industrial countries: 
an increase in the population share of younger age groups is associated with a decline in the net 
foreign asset position. A comparison of the α  coefficients between the industrial and developing 
countries also shows a greater sensitivity of the net foreign asset position to age structure in the latter 
group. However, the significance of these demographic effects is weakened when Singapore is 
excluded from the sample.
23 Finally, results for the balanced sample in column (7) are quite similar to 
those for the full sample, although the magnitude of the public debt effect falls somewhat to ￿0.50.
24 
We turn now to examining how well our panel specification, which imposes equality of all 
slope coefficients within our two country groups, can match the dynamics of net foreign assets at the 
individual country level.  For this purpose, Figures 7 and 8 plot actual and fitted long-run values of 
net foreign assets for selected industrial and developing countries.
25   
For the richer countries, the graphs suggest that our specification matches the time-series 
behavior of net foreign assets quite well in small open economies, but does not do as well for 
Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States.  For the latter country, public debt has been 
declining and growth has been strong in the late 1990s, and both factors would lead us to expect an 
                                                 
22 In most of the developing countries in our sample, public debt was primarily contracted internationally, given 
the shallowness of domestic financial markets.  
23 Singapore has undergone a dramatic demographic transition, with a rapid ageing of the population. Of course, 
this may precisely represent very good evidence regarding the effect of demography on net foreign assets, since 
Singapore has also been rapidly accumulating external assets in recent years. 
24 The balanced sample for developing countries excludes Algeria, Argentina, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Chile, 
Cote d￿Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad & Tobago, Turkey and Zimbabwe.  
25 Graphs for all other countries are available from the authors. The fitted values are generated from fixed-
effects panel OLS regressions: coefficient estimates are very similar to those obtained from the DOLS 
specification.  17 
improvement in net foreign assets. Instead, the level of US net external liabilities has increased 
substantially during this period.
26  A similar diverging pattern between actual and fitted values occurs 
in the late nineties for Japan, for exactly the symmetric reason￿faltering GDP growth and rapidly 
increasing public debt would lead us to expect, ceteris paribus, a worsening in the net foreign asset 
position, while Japan￿s improved throughout the period.
27 
For developing countries, the overall fit shown in Figure 8 is very good, with very few 
exceptions. One is Venezuela, which has severe measurement problems for its net foreign asset 
position because of the size of unrecorded assets held abroad.  The divergence for Malaysia￿s actual 
and fitted values in the 1990s is due to the same factors at work in the United States: our model 
predicts that fast growth and a declining public debt should be associated with falling external 
liabilities. 
  In summary, the data suggest that foreign asset positions in industrial countries exhibit a 
strong co-movement with relative output per capita, while their quantitative link with public debt is 
relatively weak. Conversely, public debt is very strongly correlated with the dynamics of net external 
liabilities in developing countries, while the relation with income per capita along the time series 
dimension is weak or negative. In addition, in both samples, the demographic variables generally play 
an important role in determining net foreign asset positions. Our simple econometric specification 
captures long-run trends in net foreign assets very well for developing countries and small open 
industrial economies, but is less successful in explaining the behavior of net foreign assets in larger 
countries. 
3.3.3 Cross-sectional evidence The panel data analysis presented in the previous sub-section has 
focused on the evolution of net foreign assets within countries. In this sub-section, we investigate the 
cross-sectional relation between net foreign assets and their determinants, focusing on the 1990s. 
                                                 
26 See Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) on the sustainability of the US external position. 
27 In part, these patterns can be linked to the increased degree of equity diversification across countries: for 
example, the strong performance of US equity markets during the 1990s and the weak performance of Japanese 
markets implied capital gains for foreign holders of US equities and losses for foreign holders of Japanese 
equities.  18 
Table 4 presents results of cross-sectional regressions of net foreign assets on log output per capita, 
public debt and demographic variables, where all variables are averages during the period 1990-98.
28 
  Relative output per capita is the only significant variable in explaining the cross-sectional 
variation in net foreign asset positions across industrial countries. As in the time series dimension, 
richer countries have larger net foreign asset positions, although the cross-section point estimate is 
40-50 percent smaller in magnitude. Neither public debt nor demography is helpful in explaining the 
1990s cross-section for industrial countries.  
  Our fundamentals are more successful in explaining cross-country differences in net external 
positions among developing countries. In contrast to the time series result, we find a positive 
association between output per capita and net foreign assets in the cross-section, although the point 
estimate is typically small and not significant in column (6).  Similar to the time series evidence, the 
cross-sectional effect of public debt is negative and significant: developing countries with larger 
public debts also have larger net external liabilities. Columns (4)-(6) also suggest a significant impact 
of the demographic structure on the cross-section distribution of net foreign asset positions among 
developing countries, with a pattern that is qualitatively similar to that found in the time series data. 
  The differences in the coefficients on income between the industrial and developing sample, 
both in the time series and in the cross-section, suggest that the underlying relation between net 
foreign assets and output per capita is nonlinear. We report results using a quadratic cross-sectional 
relation between output per capita and net foreign assets for developing countries in column (7).
29 The 
specification does pick up a non-monotonicity but the turning point is at a low threshold ($1170 
                                                 
28 Results are virtually unchanged if we focus on a single year, given that these variables move only slowly year 
to year.  
29 A similar specification for the whole sample gives statistically weaker results, with an estimated ￿turning 
point￿ below output per capita of US$1000.  It makes little difference to the results if Singapore is included or 
CUMCA is used as the net foreign asset measure.  19 
dollars): only 8 out of the 38 countries are in the region in which the cross-sectional relation between 
output per capita and net foreign assets is slightly negative.
30  
4. The Dynamics of Net Foreign Assets and the Trade Balance 
In the previous section, we focused on the long-run behavior of net foreign assets, arguing that it can 
be characterized as a cointegrating relation  ’ it it it bZ σε =+ . In this section, we shift our attention to 
the ￿adjustment mechanism￿￿namely, the role played by our long-run model in shaping the short-
run dynamics of net foreign assets, as well as the implications these dynamics have for the trade 
balance.  
4.1 THE ECM REPRESENTATION 
Since the underlying long-run relation is a cointegration equation, we can obtain the ￿desired￿ change 
in net foreign assets  !
it b ∆  as the fitted values from estimating an error correction mechanism 
representation 
  11 1 ’( ’ ) it it it it it it bZ b bZ β ηλ σ ν −− − ∆= ∆+ ∆ − − +  (4) 
In order to keep the model specification as parsimonious as possible we impose equality of all slope 
coefficients among the industrial and among the developing country samples in estimating this error-
correction specification. 
Table 5 reports the estimated error-correction coefficient λ and the overall fit of equation (4) 
for the different country groups and samples.  The specification of the regression also includes the 
lagged change in the dependent variable and contemporary changes in all explanatory variables 
(coefficients not reported).  Results show that deviations of net foreign assets from their long-run 
trend tend to be quite persistent, with a half-life of five-six years, and that the speed of adjustment is 
quite similar in industrial and developing countries. Given the restrictive specification of the short-run 
dynamics, the fit of the regressions is remarkably good, especially so for developing countries. 
                                                 
30 Caution should be exercised in interpreting these cross-sectional results, because our sample excludes low-
income countries that are typically highly indebted.  20 
It is useful to ask how well this simple specification accounts for the dynamics of net foreign 
assets at the individual country level.  For this purpose, Table 6 reports the country-by-country 
bivariate correlations between actual and fitted values for changes in net foreign assets for the period 
1970-98.  For industrial countries, the model does poorly in explaining the short-run dynamics of the 
net foreign asset position for most of the ￿large￿ economies ￿ Japan, United Kingdom, and United 
States ￿ while it tracks the smaller open economies, such as Ireland, Portugal and the Scandinavian 
countries, quite nicely.
31 For developing countries, the model performs remarkably well across the 
board, explaining a substantial fraction of year-to-year changes in net foreign assets, with very few 
exceptions.  
4.2 IMPLICATIONS FOR THE TRADE BALANCE  
The factors driving the net foreign asset position influence the behavior of the trade balance via two 
channels. First, changes in the desired net foreign asset position require shifts in the trade balance. 
Second, for a given desired net foreign asset position, there is an inverse relation between the 
investment returns on the outstanding stock of net foreign assets and the trade balance.  
In an accounting sense, changes in the net foreign asset position reflect trade imbalances, 
investment income payments and receipts and capital gains and losses. Formally,  
  11
ck
it it it it it it it it B B TB TR TR i B KG −− −=+++ +  (5) 
where  it TB  is the balance of trade in goods and services,  ( )
ck
it it TR TR  are net current (capital) transfers, 
1 it it iB−  is investment income and KGt is the capital gain/loss on outstanding net external assets. The 
current account is given by the sum of  it TB , 
c
it TR  and investment income  1 it it iB − .
32 Dividing both 
sides of equation (5) by GDP measured in US dollars, adding together investment income and capital 
                                                 
31 One reason why the model may not fully capture the dynamics of the net foreign asset position for the former 
group of countries is that these are financial centers and high levels of gross international asset trade mean that 
the impact of volatile revaluation effects on the net foreign asset position is likely to be especially important. 
32 The expression  1 it it iB −  for investment income implicitly assumes that the dollar yield on external assets and 
liabilities is the same.  We discuss below the implications of this assumption.  21 
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it tb  is the ratio to GDP of the balance of goods, services, and current transfers;   it it ik g + is the 
nominal rate of return on outstanding net foreign assets (nominal yield iit plus capital gains/losses); 
and γ  is the rate of change of GDP measured in current dollars. Note that 1 (1 )(1 )(1 *) g γ επ +=+ + + , 
where  g  is the real GDP growth rate, ε  is the rate of real exchange rate appreciation of the home 
country￿s currency vis-￿-vis the US$ and  * π  is US inflation. 
  In turn, we can re-arrange equation (6) to relate the ￿transfer-corrected￿ trade balance to our 
estimate of the change in the net foreign asset position, given in equation (4) 
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where  it r  is the real rate of return on net foreign assets, measured in US dollars.
33 The  ￿transfer-
corrected￿ trade balance is related to three factors. The first term on the RHS of this equation reflects 
the change in the net foreign asset position that is required for convergence to its long-run 
fundamental value, as captured by the ECM representation in section 4.1; the second term ( it −Ψ ) is 
the combined effect of overall returns, output growth, and real exchange rate changes, interacted with 
the past net foreign asset position; and the third term is the component of the change in net foreign 
assets that is not explained by the dynamics of its long-run fundamentals.  Consider for example a 
debtor country for which the rate of return on its net liabilities is higher than its growth rate. In this 
case if the ￿fundamental￿ net foreign asset position does not change, the country will need to run a 
trade surplus equal to  it Ψ .  
                                                 
33 In the presence of differences in rates of return between external assets and liabilities the RHS would also 
include the term  1 ()
LA L
it it it rr b − − where 
LA
it it rr −  is the rate of return differential between liabilities and assets 
and  1
L
it b − is the stock of gross liabilities.  We implicitly include this term in the adjusted returns  it Ψ .  22 
  In Figure 9 we show the distribution of adjusted returns  it Ψ and the trade balance 
*
it tb among 
industrial and developing countries for the periods 1980-89 and 1990-98.
 34 The low growth and real 
depreciation associated with the debt crisis are reflected in the high number of less developed 
countries with large negative adjusted returns during the 1980s, a number that declines in the 1990s. 
Among industrial countries one observes an increase in the number of countries with large negative 
adjusted returns during the 1990s, and correspondingly in the countries running large trade surpluses.  
The increase in rates of return generated by the capital gains on equity holdings during the 1990s are 
one factor behind this development. Figure 9 also highlights that there is more dispersion in the trade 
balance among developing than among industrial countries.  
  Figure 10 presents scatter diagrams illustrating the cross-sectional relation between the 
adjusted returns term and the trade balance for the industrial and developing countries for the period 
1980-98.  The Figures also show a line with a negative slope of 45 degrees that corresponds, for a 
given level of adjusted returns, to the trade balance that would keep the net foreign asset position 
constant (in the absence of capital transfers such as debt forgiveness).  In both samples there is a 
strong negative relationship between adjusted returns and trade balance. Some observations are 
noteworthy. First, the United States￿ adjusted returns term is positive, a reflection of the positive rate 
of return differential between its external assets and liabilities. This implies that a trade deficit of 0.5 
percent of GDP over the past 2 decades would have been consistent with an unchanged net foreign 
asset position.  In fact the trade deficit has been much larger, in connection with the deterioration of 
                                                 
34 The construction of the ￿adjusted returns￿ term  it ψ  is complicated by the measurement problems associated 
with capital gains and losses briefly discussed in Section 2.
 For industrial countries, the series for  it KG includes 
the difference between the change in the outstanding stock and the flow for portfolio equity investment assets 
and liabilities, foreign direct investment assets and liabilities, and foreign exchange reserves. These differences 
are particularly significant for portfolio equity assets and liabilities, especially during the 1990s, because of the 
fluctuations in market values generated by stock markets trends and volatility.  Our data do not allow us to 
estimate capital gains and losses on the debt portfolio of industrial countries. For developing countries, the 
series on capital gains and losses includes one additional item--the impact of cross-currency fluctuations on the 
outstanding stock of gross external debt (data that are reported in the World Bank￿s Global Development 
Finance database).  23 
the US net external position.  Second, Singapore￿s spectacular increase in its net foreign assets, even 
given its large positive adjusted returns term, has required large trade surpluses.  
  In summary, the results in this section show that the long-run fundamentals driving the net 
foreign asset positions can also explain an important fraction of short-run changes in countries￿ 
external wealth, and that the behavior of the trade balance is tightly related to the dynamics of the net 
foreign asset position. The extent to which changes in the underlying fundamentals of the net external 
position and correction in any drift from the long-run equilibrium relation are reflected in the trade 
balance depends on the ￿adjusted￿ returns on the outstanding net foreign asset position. 
5. Net Foreign Assets and Real Interest Differentials 
Rates of return on assets and liabilities play a crucial role in determining the dynamic behavior of net 
foreign assets, and are likely to be influenced by their level and composition. For instance, a home 
bias in asset demand and/or an upward-sloping supply of international funds means that interest rates 
may be linked to net foreign asset positions: debtor countries should experience higher interest rates 
than creditor countries.  Applications of this ￿portfolio balance￿ approach have typically related 
currency returns to shifts in relative asset supplies in different currencies (e.g. a model of dollar 
interest rates versus yen interest rates) but the model should hold more generally as a framework for 
thinking about country risk (Frankel and Rose, 1995). 
  In this spirit, the real interest rate differential can be written as 
  1 [] it wt it t t rr ER E R δ + −=−∆  (8) 
where  it δ  is the country risk premium and the second term on the right hand side is (minus) the 
expected rate of real exchange rate appreciation.  
  If the rate of real appreciation is zero in a steady state, then the long-run real interest 
differential just depends on the steady-state country risk premium 
   0 it wt it it rr b x δδ δ −== − >  (9)  24 
where we model the country risk premium as inversely (and linearly) related to the ratio of net foreign 
assets to exports  it bx .
35  
5.1 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
We confine attention to the industrial country sample. Nominal interest rates are yields on 
government bonds, the same employed by Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000, 2001).
36  We measure the real 
interest rate as the December nominal interest rate in year t minus the actual inflation rate in year t+1. 
We report the panel fixed-effects results in Table 9, where the DOLS estimator is again 
employed. In panel A, we include all countries and the time dummies soak up the ￿world real interest 
rate￿ that is common to all countries; in panel B, we employ the real interest differential vis-￿-vis the 
US. The actual ratio of net foreign assets to exports in employed as a regressor in columns (1)-(4), 
whereas we use the fitted values generated in section 3.3.2 in columns (5)-(8).
37 The results in 
columns (1)-(2) and (5)-(6) are for the 1970-98 period; and for 1980-98 in columns (3)-(4) and (7)-
(8). We also enter the stock of public debt and the rate of real exchange rate appreciation in alternate 
specifications.
38 In line with the portfolio balance literature, the former is intended to control for 
variation in the supply of alternative assets; the latter is to proxy for expected changes in the real 
exchange rate. 
Across columns (1)-(8), the results show clear evidence of a portfolio balance effect in the 
determination of real interest differentials: for instance, according to the point estimate in column (1) 
of panel B, a 20 percentage point improvement in the ratio of net foreign assets to exports position is 
associated with an 50 basis point reduction in the real interest rate differential. The effect is also 
                                                 
35 We use exports rather than GDP as the denominator to better capture the capacity of the economy to make 
overseas payments.  The choice of denominator makes little practical difference for the results. 
36 Iceland is excluded from the sample. We thank these authors and Jay Shambaugh for generous assistance 
with these data. 
37 In section 3.3.2, we regressed the ratio of net foreign assets to GDP on output per capita, the stock of public 
debt and demographic variables.  We multiply the fitted values from this regression by the ratio of GDP to 
exports. 
38 In line with the method for measuring expected inflation, the actual rate of real exchange rate appreciation in 
year t+1 proxies for the expected rate of real appreciation in year t+1. In panel A, we use a multivariate CPI-
based real exchange rate series; in panel B, it is the bilateral CPI-based real exchange rate vis-￿-vis the US.  25 
significant for the 1980-98 period and the estimated point coefficient typically larger for the more 
recent period. These findings are little affected by inclusion of the stock of public debt and the rate of 
real exchange rate appreciation. Even stronger results are obtained when the net foreign asset position 
is instrumented by the level of GDP per capita, public debt and demographic variables in columns 
(5)-(8), suggesting that the relation is not being generated by reverse causality running from the real 
interest differential on the net foreign asset position. 
Figure 10 provides a scatter plot of average net foreign assets and real interest rates over the 
period 1990-98, documenting a negative relation between these variables. Table 10 reports cross-
section regression results for the same period.  In the cross-section, net foreign assets again have a 
significant effect on the real interest rate differential across all specifications. For instance, the point 
estimate of ￿1.07 in column (1) of panel B indicates that, all else equal, a country with an average net 
foreign asset to exports ratio that is 50 percentage points above the sample mean enjoys a real interest 
rate that is 53.5 basis points below the average real interest rate differential vis-￿-vis the US. We note 
also that the stock of public debt typically has a marginally significant positive impact on the real 
interest differential rate (at the 10 percent level) but real exchange rate appreciation has no impact in 
the cross-sectional specification. 
The results in this section provide some suggestive evidence that net foreign asset positions 
matter in determining real interest rate differentials, in line with the spirit of the portfolio balance 
literature.
39 In future work, it would be instructive to experiment with different asset classes and 
maturities and explore alternative techniques for calculating expected inflation and the expected rate 
of real appreciation. Moreover, it would be interesting to distinguish between different components of 
the net foreign asset position (e.g. is it just net external debt that matters? / do portfolio equity 
                                                 
39 Bayoumi and Gagnon (1996) predict that a country￿s net foreign asset position should be negatively 
correlated with its (after-tax) real interest rate.  In this case, our estimate of the portfolio balance effect will be 
understated if a high real interest rate endogenously improves the net foreign asset position. We further note that 
inflation and real interest rates are negatively correlated in the time series dimension of our data set but 
positively correlated in the cross-section.  26 
liabilities and FDI liabilities have different effects?) and to investigate the interaction between net 
foreign asset positions and other risk factors in determining real interest rate differentials. 
6. Conclusions 
Our primary goal in this paper has been to demonstrate the fruitfulness of studying the behavior of a 
key state variable in international macroeconomics: namely, the net foreign asset position. We have 
shown that persistent fundamentals --- output per capita, public debt and demographic variables --- 
have a major influence on the direction of international asset trade. Moreover, we have examined the 
role played by the desired and actual net foreign asset position in determining the trade balance, the 
former since trade balances are typically required to accomplish changes in the target net foreign asset 
position, the latter due to the role played by investment returns on outstanding foreign assets and 
liabilities. Finally, we have presented evidence that the net foreign asset position is also important in 
determining international asset prices, exerting a negative influence on real interest rate differentials. 
Given the space limitations, there are many interesting questions concerning foreign asset and 
liability positions that we cannot address in this paper. In other work, we have shown that net foreign 
asset positions exert an important influence on the long-run behavior of real exchange rates (Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti 2000a) and made an initial exploration of the determinants of the structure of the 
￿international balance sheet￿ between debt, portfolio equity and foreign direct investment (Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti 2000b). Among the important issues that we must defer to future research is the role 
played by the level and composition of the external balance sheet in determining the probability of a 
financial crisis, and an exploration of the factors driving differences in cross-countries rates of return 
on external assets and liabilities.  27 
Appendix 
Our demographic specification follows Fair and Dominguez (1991) and Higgins (1998). We divide 
the population into  12 J = age cohorts and the age variables enter the net foreign assets equation as 
12
1 jj t j p α
= ∑ where  jt p  is the population share of cohort  j in period t and  
12
1 0 j j α
= = ∑ . We make 
the restriction that the coefficients lie along a cubic polynomial 
 
23
01 2 3 j jj j α γγ γ γ =+ + +  
The zero-sum restriction on the coefficients implies that 
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In turn, we can estimate  123 ,, γγγ by introducing the age variables into the estimated equation in the 
following way 
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Finally, we can easily recover the implicit  j α once we know  0123 ,,, γγγγ .  28 
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Table 1. Kao (1999) and Pedroni (1999) cointegration tests 
  
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Industrial Industrial Developing  Developing 
  1970-98  1980-98 1970-98 1980-98 
 
























Pedroni (1999) t stat for  "









Note: cointegration tests are performed on the vector including NFA, log GDP per capita, public debt and the 
three composite demographic variables.  The table reports the value of the statistic, with p-values in parenthesis.  
The null hypothesis in all tests is lack of cointegration.  DF (ADF) stands for (augmented) Dickey-Fuller.   32 
Table 2. Determinants of net foreign assets, industrial countries 
Panel DOLS regressions with fixed time and country effects 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
  CUMCA CUMCA  CUMCA+IIP  CUMCA+IIP    CUMCA 
  1970-98 1980-98 1970-98  1980-98 
Balanced 
1972-97 
       
Log GDP per capita  0.91  0.91  0.9  0.89 0.94 
  (12.63)**  (7.26)**  (12.55)**  (6.71)** (11.66)** 
           
Public Debt  -0.125  -0.05  -0.124 -0.07  -0.18 
  (3.1)**  (0.9)  (3.01)** (1.1) (4.54)** 
         
2 χ  (Demog.)  30.1 2.3 22.1 4.2 
 
43.6 
  (0.00)** (0.51) (0.00)** (0.24) (0.00)** 
             
Adjusted R
2  0.89 0.91 0.89 0.93  0.9 
             
Observations  516 389 516 382 390 
             
Countries  22 22 22 22 15 
             
α (POP<15)  -1.47 -0.81 -1.24  -1.2  -2.26 
             
α (POP>64)  -0.66 -0.59 -1.29 -0.44 -0.05 
             
α  max  1.41 0.46 1.24 0.63 1.24 
  (50-54) (35-39) (50-54) (30-34) (50-54) 
             
α  min  -1.49 -0.81 -1.29  -1.2  -2.26 
  (15-19) (0-14) (15-19) (0-14)  (0-14) 
 
 
* Dynamic ordinary least squares, t-statistics in parentheses (p-value for the 
2 χ  (Demog.) statistic). * (**) 
indicates statistical significance at the 5% (1%) confidence level.  In regressions (1) and (2) the dependent 
variable is CUMCA for all countries except Belgium, for which it is the IIP estimate of net foreign assets minus 
gold. In regression (3) the dependent variable is the IIP estimate of NFA for Belgium, Canada, Italy, Japan and 
United Kingdom, and CUMCA for all other countries.  In regression (4) it is the IIP estimate of NFA for 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United 
Kingdom and United States and CUMCA for the remaining countries.  33 
Table 3. Determinants of net foreign assets, developing countries 
Panel DOLS regressions with fixed time and country effects 
 
    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
    CUMCA CUMCA CUMCA CUMCA CUMFL CUMFL  CUMCA 
  1970-98 1980-98 1970-98 1980-98 1970-98 1980-98    1977-97 
  All All No Sing.  No Sing.  No Sing.  No Sing.  Balanced 
         
Log GDP per capita  -0.21 -0.08 -0.29 -0.2  -0.31 -0.25 -0.26 
    (4.59)** (1.05)  (6.76)** (2.98)** (6.8)**  (3.6)**  (3.55)** 
            
Public Debt  -0.67 -0.67 -0.73 -0.71 -0.86 -0.86 -0.50 
    (14.03)**  (13.3)** (16.8)** (14.6)** (21.4)** (19.6)**  (8.87)** 
   
 
      
 
 






















           
            
Adjusted R
2    0.83 0.87 0.85 0.88 0.89 0.91  0.89 
            
Observations  779 590 753 572 728 566 416 
            
Countries  39 39 38 38 38 38 16 
            
α (POP<15)    -1.01 -0.38 -0.49 -0.78 -0.9  -1.11  -1.17 
            
α (POP>64)   -0.522 0.158  2.05  2.47  4.33  4.6  0.55 
            
α  max  3.92 3.54 2.05 2.47 4.33 4.6  5.66 
   (50-54)  (55-59)  (65+)  (65+)  (65+)  (65+)  (55-59) 
           
α  min    -3.92 -3.54 -1.19 -1.1  -1.18 -1.14 -5.67 
    (20-24) (20-24) (25-29) (20-24) (45-49) (35-39) (20-24) 
*Dynamic ordinary least squares, t-statistics in parentheses (p-value for the 
2 χ  (Demog.) statistic). * (**) 
indicates statistical significance at the 5% (1%) confidence level.  In regressions (1)￿(4) the dependent 
variable is CUMCA, in regressions (5) and (6) it is CUMFL.  Regressions (3)-(6) exclude Singapore from 
the sample.  34 
Table 4. Net foreign assets: cross-sectional regressions 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  CUMCA CUMCA+IIP  CUMCA CUMCA CUMFL  CUMFL 
  1990-98 1990-98 1990-98 1990-98 1990-98    1990-98   
  Industrial  Industrial  Dev  Dev, no Sing  Dev, no Sing  Dev, no Sing 
        
Log GDP per capita 0.45  0.54  0.18 0.17 0.15 -1.87 
  (3.58)**  (2.92)**  (2.32)** (2.0)**  (1.6)  (2.93)** 
        
Log GDP per capita 
squared 
       
0.13 
(3.26)** 
Public Debt  0.10  -0.11 -0.44 -0.45 -0.65 -0.71 
  (0.7)  (0.35)  (4.52)** (4.47)** (5.18)** (6.55)** 
        
2 χ  (Demog.)  3.05 2.21 35.3 33.6 36.7 1.35 
  (0.38)  (0.53)  (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.28) 
        
Adjusted R
2  0.45 0.33 0.62 0.57 0.63 0.69 
        
Countries  22 22 39 38 38 38 
        
α (POP<15)  -1.2  394.2  -489.2 -442.3 -276.9 -2.25 
        
α (POP>64)  -0.44  -1314.6  1527.8 1389.0 921.8  -0.04 
        
α  max  0.62  424.3  1527.8 1389.0 921.8  1.24 
  (30-34)  (15-19)  (65+) (65+) (65+) (50-54) 
        
α  min  -1.2  -1314.6  -511.9 -464.0 -298.1 -2.25 
  (0-14)  (65+)  (20-24) (20-24) (35-39) (0.14) 
        
 
* Ordinary least squares, heteroskedasticity-corrected t-statistics in parentheses (p-value for the 
2 χ  
(Demog.) statistic). * (**) indicates statistical significance at the 5% (1%) confidence level.  In regressions 
(1) the dependent variable is CUMCA for all countries except Belgium, for which it is the IIP estimate of 
net foreign assets minus gold. In regression (2) the dependent variable is the IIP estimate of NFA for  
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom and United States and CUMCA for the remaining countries.  Regressions (3)-(6) refer to 
the developing country sample, In regressions (3) and (4), the dependent variable is CUMCA, in regression 
(5) it is CUMFL.  Regressions (4)-(5) exclude Singapore.  35 
Table 5. Changes in net foreign assets: speed of adjustment  
Panel regressions, error-correction specification 
 
A. Industrial countries* 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  CUMCA CUMCA CUMCA+IIP  CUMCA+IIP 
  1970-98 1980-98 1970-98 1980-98 
      
Error Correct.  -0.11 -0.17 -0.12 -0.14 
  (4.11)** (4.59)** (4.23)** (3.34)** 
 
Adjusted R
2   0.28 0.30 0.27 0.13 
Observations  539 393 537 374 
Countries   22 22 22 22 
 
* Ordinary least squares, t-statistics in parentheses (p-value for the 
2 χ  (Demog.) statistic). * (**) indicates 
statistical significance at the 5% (1%) confidence level.  Regressions also include the lagged first difference in 
CUMCA, contemporaneous first differences in the other variables belonging to the Z vector and country and 
time dummies.  In regressions (1) and (2) the dependent variable is the change in CUMCA for all countries 
except Belgium, for which it is the change in the IIP estimate of net foreign assets minus gold. In regression (3) 
the dependent variable is the change in the IIP estimate of NFA for Belgium, Canada, Italy, Japan and United 
Kingdom, and the change in CUMCA for all other countries.  In regression (4) it is the change in the IIP 
estimate of NFA for Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States and the change in CUMCA for the remaining countries. 
 
B. Developing countries** 
 













  1970-98 1980-98 1970-98 1980-98 1970-98 1980-98 
        
Error Correct.  -0.06 -0.11 -0.10 -0.16 -0.10 -0.15 
  (2.36)*  (2.96)** (4.99)** (5.05)** (4.53)** (4.66)** 
 
Adjusted R
2  0.44 0.45 0.48 0.50 0.54 0.56 
Observations  849 612 822 594 786 585 
Countries  39 39 38 38 38 38 
** Ordinary least squares, t-statistics in parentheses (p-value for the 
2 χ  (Demog.) statistic). * (**) indicates 
statistical significance at the 5% (1%) confidence level.  In regressions (1)-(4) the dependent variable is the 
change in CUMCA, in regressions (5)-(6) it is the change in CUMFL. Regressions also include the lagged first 
difference in the dependent variable, contemporaneous first differences in the other variables belonging to the Z 
vector and country and time dummies.  Regressions (3)-(6) exclude Singapore from the sample.   36 
 
Table 6. Correlation between actual and fitted change in net foreign assets* 
 
Industrial countries  Observ.  Correlation  Devel. countries  Observ.  Correlation 
          
Australia 24  0.07  Algeria 8  0.49 
Austria 27  0.80  Argentina  7  0.90 
Belgium 16  0.40  Bolivia  4  0.95 
Canada 27  0.17  Botswana  19  0.67 
Denmark 18  0.74  Brazil 18  0.79 
Finland 27  0.71  Chile 10  0.76 
France 21  0.55  Colombia  27  0.81 
Germany 27  0.40  Costa  Rica  27  0.88 
Greece 26  0.68  C￿te  D’Ivoire  8  0.94 
Iceland 18  0.83  Dominic.  Rep.  5  0.82 
Ireland 27  0.79  Ecuador  27  0.88 
Italy 27  0.69  El  Salvador  27  0.60 
Japan 27  0.10  Guatemala  24  0.32 
Netherlands 27  -0.31  India  24  0.42 
New Zealand  27  0.58  Indonesia  26  0.50 
Norway 27  0.62  Israel 27  0.72 
Portugal 25  0.81  Jamaica  27  0.80 
Spain 22  0.46  Jordan  23  0.77 
Sweden 27  0.72  Korea  27  0.77 
Switzerland 18  -0.35  Malaysia 27  0.56 
United Kingdom  27  0.19  Mauritius  26  0.81 
United States  27  0.01  Mexico  24  0.17 
     Morocco  27  0.92 
     Pakistan  26  0.85 
     Panama  27  0.21 
     Paraguay  22  0.77 
     Peru  8  0.80 
     Philippines  27  0.60 
     South  Africa  27  0.62 
     Sri  Lanka  25  0.78 
     Taiwan  23  0.71 
     Thailand  27  0.44 
     Trinidad&T.  21  0.75 
     Tunisia  27  0.76 
     Turkey  22  0.48 
     Uruguay  24  0.87 
     Venezuela  27  0.34 
     Zimbabwe  20  0.63 
*Correlation coefficient between actual and fitted values of changes in the ratio of net foreign assets 
to GDP. Regressions for the period 1970-98 corresponding to column (1) in Table (5), panel A  for 
industrial countries and column (5) in Table 5, panel B for developing countries.  37 
  
Table 7. Real Interest Rates and Real interest Differentials 
Panel DOLS regressions with fixed time and country effects 
 
A. Real interest rate 
  (1)   (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
















          
NFA/exports  -1.06 -0.83 -1.36 -0.91 -1.5  -1.63 -2.87 -2.81 
  (2.6)* (2.0)* (2.48)*  (1.66) (2.45)*  (2.94)**  (4.48)**  (4.65)** 
          
Public  debt   3.82   7.1   2.98   3.56 
   (2.1)*   (3.4)**   (2.03)*   (1.91)* 
          
D(RER)   0.03   0.04   0.02   2.64 
   (1.2)   (1.74)   (.9)   (1.23) 
          
Adjusted R
2  0.5  0.56 0.36 0.39 0.54 0.59 0.43 0.46 
Countries  21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 
Observations  462 410 362 336 442 410 358 336 
 
B. Real interest differential 
  (1)   (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
















          
NFA/exports  -2.54 -2.44 -2.73 -2.22 -2.57 -2.77 -3.19 -3.24 
  (5.41)** (5.5)**  (4.3)**  (4.58)** (4.03)** (4.27)** (4.83)** (5.52)** 
          
Public  debt   3.18   7.79   2.23   3.18 
   (1.76)   (4.82)**   (1.51)   (1.67) 
          
D(RER)   -0.04   -0.014   0.012   0.015 
   (2.15)*   (.78)   (.54)   (.66) 
          
Adjusted R
2  0.58 0.59 0.6  0.64 0.6  0.59 0.63 0.67 
Countries  21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 
Observations  423 403 344 338 416 386 340 319 
 
*Sample is Industrial Countries, with exception of Iceland. In panel A, dependent variable is the 
real interest rate; in panel B, dependent variable is real interest differential vis-￿-vis the US. In 
regressions (1)-(4), CUMCA is employed as measure of NFA; in regressions (5)-(8), it is based 
on fitted value from regression of NFA on GDP per capita, public debt and demographic 
variables. In regressions (2), 4), (6) and (8), multivariate real exchange rate is employed in panel 
A and bivariate real exchange rate vis-￿-vis the US in panel B. * (**) indicates statistical 
significance at the 5% (1%) confidence level.  38 
Table 8. Real Interest Rates And Real Interest Differentials: Cross-Section Evidence 
A. Real interest rate 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  RINT 1990-98  RINT 1990-98  RINT 1990-98  RINT 1990-98 
NFA/exports  -0.88 -0.88 -1.2  -1.18 
  (2.6)* (2.68)*  (5.39)**  (5.28)** 
      
Public  debt   1.57   1.31 
    (1.55)   (1.67)   
      
D(RER)   -0.19   -0.19 
  (0.9)   (1.1) 
     
Adjusted R
2  0.31 0.35 0.49 0.52 
      
Countries  21 21 21 21 
 
B. Real interest differential 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  RDIF 1990-98  RDIF 1990-98  RDIF 1990-98  RDIF 1990-98 
NFA/exports  -1.07 -1.07 -1.27 -1.26 
  (3.62)** (4.12)** (6.61)** (8.21)** 
     
Public  debt   1.72   1.33 
    (1.8)   (1.7) 
     
D(RER)   -0.08   -0.1 
  (.43)   (.72) 
     
Adjusted R
2  0.54 0.59 0.65 0.68 
     
Countries  20 20 20 20 
 
*Sample is Industrial Countries, with exception of Iceland. 1990-98 averaged data. In panel A, 
dependent variable is the real interest rate; in panel B, dependent variable is real interest 
differential vis-￿-vis the US. In regressions (1)-(2),  CUMCA is employed as measure of NFA; in 
regressions (3)-(4) it is based on fitted value from regression of NFA on GDP per capita, public 
debt and demographic variables. In regressions (2) and (4), multivariate real exchange rate is 
employed in panel A and bivariate real exchange rate vis-￿-vis the US in panel B. * (**) indicates 
statistical significance at the 5% (1%) confidence level.  39 
 




























* Number of countries with net foreign asset position in the given range on the specific year on 
the vertical axis.  
  40 
Figure 2. Net Foreign Assets, Industrial Countries 
Australia
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Figure 3. Net Foreign Assets, Developing Countries 
Argentina
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Figure 4. Net foreign assets and GDP per capita 
(average change, 1990-98 over 1980-89) 
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Figure 5.  Net foreign assets and public debt  
(average change, 1990-98 over 1980-89) 
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Figure 6 Impact of change in demographics on change in net foreign assets. 
(average change, 1990-98 over 1980-89) 
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Figure 7.Actual and fitted values, net foreign assets, selected industrial countries 
Canada
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Figure 8. Actual and fitted values, net foreign assets, selected developing countries 
Argentina
 
 actual  fitted






 actual  fitted







 actual  fitted






 actual  fitted







 actual  fitted







 actual  fitted







 actual  fitted








 actual  fitted







 actual  fitted





   - 47 - 
 
Note: Number of countries with adjusted returns and trade balance (ratios of GDP), averaged over the corresponding time period, within the given range. 
Figure 9. Trade balance and adjusted returns: cross-country dispersion, 1980s and 1990s
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* Average data, 1990-1998. 